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Governing the carbon offset market 
 
Abstract 
 
Carbon offsets are produced and sold under the international climate change regime 
(the United Nations Kyoto Protocol) and also within an expanding voluntary offset 
market in which companies and individuals can voluntarily opt to compensate for 
their greenhouse gas emissions.  The volume of carbon produced and consumed 
within compliance and voluntary markets has grown dramatically in the last five 
years, raising a number of governance challenges. This Focus Article gives an 
overview of the governance of the compliance and voluntary carbon offset markets, 
and considers the implications of their different governance structures for addressing 
climate change. It assesses recent changes in the governance of the voluntary carbon 
offset market in response to concerns about the credibility and robustness of voluntary 
carbon offsets. Several voluntary offset standards were launched in 2007-09, 
including the Voluntary Carbon Standard and the Gold Standard. National 
governments have also taken regulatory action on voluntary offsets, notably the UK 
government who took the controversial decision in early 2009 to endorse only 
compliance carbon offsets for use in the UK voluntary market.  The UK government’s 
attempt to regulate the voluntary offset market provides a useful case through which 
to explore some of the inherent tensions in effectively governing the carbon offset 
market. 
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Carbon offset; CDM (Clean Development Mechanism), Certified Emission Reduction 
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Governing the compliance and voluntary carbon offset markets 
The two main types of global carbon offset market currently in operation are the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)1 - a regulated or compliance market, 
established by the Kyoto Protocol - and the voluntary offset market, an informal or 
‘parallel’ market currently governed by a mix of non-governmental and private sector 
organisations. In conducting an assessment of the governance of carbon offset 
markets, it is instructive to consider separately the two types of market, as they are 
regulated in different ways (for a detailed overview of the history of the compliance 
and voluntary carbon offset markets see Advanced Review (13.5.2.)).  Governance - 
distinct from ‘government’ and ‘governing’ - refers here to broad processes of 
framing and managing the production and consumption of carbon offsets, with close 
attention to how power and authority are exercised by a range of different actors, both 
state and non-state, to realize their objectives and interests. Governance of carbon 
offset markets is important for several reasons, including: addressing ethical concerns 
about climate fraud [1] and sustainable development [2]; corporate requirements for a 
robust, transparent system to guarantee and support carbon disclosure and emission 
allowance reporting [3]; and meeting the overall objective of carbon markets to 
efficiently and effectively reduce atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions.  A carbon 
offset allows emission reduction targets to be met in one location by purchasing 
emission reductions from a climate mitigation project based elsewhere (and so relies 
on the uniform global mixing of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere).  Carbon offsets 
are a sub-set of a broader category - carbon credits – which includes emission 
allowances as well as project-based offsets. Emission allowances produced in so-
called ‘cap and trade’ systems (most notably the European Emission Trading System 
(EU ETS)) whereby companies or factories have an overall cap on their emission 
reductions, and can buy and sell allowances to meet it. This Focus Article discusses 
project-based carbon offsets only. 
 
The two main types of carbon offset – compliance (CDM) and voluntary – are 
introduced separately below, before turning to consider the governance of the 
voluntary offset market in more depth. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the two 
offset markets – voluntary and compliance - are interlinked: they co-evolved from a 
common base in the early 1990s; a growing number of carbon offset organisations 
produce and retail both types of offset; and credits from ‘failed’ or delayed 
compliance offset projects are commonly sold in the voluntary market.  Conceptually 
they share two key governance challenges: first, how to produce robust, credible 
carbon offsets that equate to real atmospheric emission reductions, and, second, how 
communicate to and reassure consumers of offsets that this is indeed the case. 
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
The CDM, established under the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, is primarily governed under 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The 
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UNFCCC incorporates several different committees and levels of administration, the 
most important of which to carbon offset governance is the CDM Executive Board 
(and associated UN committees and working groups such as the CDM Methodology 
Panel, Accreditation Panel, and small scale working group). In practice key 
governance roles are also played by corporations (verifiers, project originators) and 
non-governmental organisations. The CDM has mechanisms to define credits strictly 
and establish standards of quality through project methodologies. This is typically a 
lengthy and complex process, with each project having to go through several stages 
(project design, methodology approval, validation, registration and verification) 
before a CDM offset, termed a Certified Emission Reduction (CER) is finally issued, 
taking an average of over 500 days from validation to registration [4]. A set of 
governance concerns has been raised in the compliance offset market regarding the 
large amount of regulation involved in establishing and verifying emission reduction 
projects and the time and resource implications for the organisations involved, so-
called ‘CDM bureaucracy’ [5]. 
There are also legal documents to register each CDM greenhouse gas reduction 
project which enable the buying and selling of credits.  All CDM projects must be 
registered through the CDM Executive Board, and carbon finance is typically 
channeled through private-sector or World Bank carbon funds, which then finance 
offset projects in the developing world [6].  For a country to be involved with the 
CDM (either as a host country, or purchaser of credits) it must be a signatory to the 
Kyoto Protocol. Developing (host) countries are required to designate a state 
institution (a ‘Designated National Authority’ (DNA)) that certifies in writing that a 
CDM project “assists in achieving sustainable development” under UNFCCC treaty 
requirements [7]. Once the offset project is operational the carbon credits (termed 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)) are then listed in the International Transaction 
Log (ITL) hosted by the UNFCCC.  Developed (Kyoto Protocol Annex I) 
governments can then use the credits from projects they have invested in as 
compliance with emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol. The ITL aims to 
provide a transparent and efficient mechanism to trade and account for CERs, and it is 
a good illustration of the intricate international regulations that have been established 
in an attempt to ensure robust and transparent governance in the compliance offset 
market [6].  
The voluntary offset market 
In contrast to the centralized and bureaucratic offset approval process in the CDM, 
offset production in the voluntary market is considerably more diverse and flexible. 
The voluntary offset market allows companies and individuals who wish to offset 
their emissions to directly compensate for their greenhouse gas emissions.  The 
voluntary offset market has developed relatively independently of the international 
Kyoto Protocol and anybody – NGOs, businesses, individuals – can produce and 
consume voluntary offsets however they choose: there are, as yet, no widely-used 
international standards or regulations. Voluntary offsets, in contrast to the CDM, are 
  4 
governed principally by private and third sector (NGO and charitable) institutions: 
there is no voluntary market equivalent of the CDM Executive Board. The voluntary 
offset market is much more informal than the compliance market, with no single 
definition for credits and several competing standards which set criteria for how 
voluntary offset projects should be set up and managed (covering issues such as local 
community involvement, emission reduction measurement, verification etc.).  
Voluntary carbon offsets are either called ‘VCOs’ or ‘Verified Emission Reductions’ 
(VERs), depending on whether they have been independently verified (i.e. signed off 
by an auditor) or not.  Confusingly, there are several alternative names used by the 
different voluntary standards (see Table One).  In light of concerns about the degree 
to which compliance offsetting adequately addresses wider sustainable development 
issues in the Global South [2], an important additional feature of voluntary carbon 
offsets compared with compliance offsets produced via the CDM are their sustainable 
development and poverty-alleviation ‘side benefits’ [8]. 
The first voluntary offset organisations were established in the mid to late 1990s and 
were typically focused on forestry offsets (such as Climate Care and The Carbon 
Neutral Company (formerly known as Future Forests Ltd.)).  Until the year 2005 there 
were just a handful of voluntary offset organizations producing and retailing carbon 
credits world-wide, but since then the sector has boomed. There are now hundreds of 
companies and non-governmental organisations that produce and sell carbon credits in 
a variety of ways to individual consumers and companies which are currently outside 
state-based emissions-reduction regulation. Despite the recession the voluntary 
market has remained relatively buoyant: in 2008 123 million metric tonnes of carbon 
was transacted in global voluntary carbon markets, representing an 87% growth on 
2007 volumes [9].  However, this growth must be viewed in the context of changes in 
the compliance market (in particular increasingly rigorous CDM approval which has 
boosted the number of CDM ‘pre-compliance’ credits reaching the voluntary market, 
because a large number of CDM offset projects are being held up or rejected), as well 
as anticipated climate change regulation (e.g. in the US, leading to increased 
purchasing of voluntary offsets on the expectation that they will be converted in time 
into compliance offsets). 
 
Unlike offset organisations working within the tightly-regulated structure imposed by 
the UNFCCC and the CDM, voluntary offset organisations can use a range of 
approaches and governance practices to source projects and generate carbon credits.  
Often described as a ‘parallel market’, voluntary offset projects tend to be smaller, 
have a greater sustainable development focus (often described as social or community 
‘side-benefits’), and are typically located in countries not active in the CDM (e.g. the 
non-Kyoto signatory the United States (produces 28% of voluntary offsets) and 
Middle Eastern countries (15%), as well as in Asia (45%) – see Figure 1a). By 
comparison the large majority of CDM offsets originate from China (84%); a country 
that dominates the compliance market (see Figure 1b).  
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An additional argument commonly put forward by voluntary market supporters is that 
the voluntary market has lower transaction costs than the CDM. This is seen as an 
advantage in that it allows more greenhouse gas emission reductions for an equivalent 
price compared with the CDM. However, the issue actually pertains to the 
rigorousness of the offset production process: it follows that the more rigorous the 
rules and regulations are for offset production (e.g. in the CDM), then the higher the 
price fetched by the offset, because the product comes with a higher guarantee of its 
value. 
  
 
Figure One – Comparison of the origin of voluntary carbon offsets (by region) and 
CDM offsets (by country) 
(Based on 2008 over the counter volume of transactions; sources: 2009 State of the 
Voluntary Carbon Market Report: iv; 2009 World Bank State of the Carbon Market 
Report: 35) 
 
Governing carbon offsets: insights from voluntary market standards 
The remainder of this short Focus Article concentrates on recent developments in the 
governance of the voluntary offset market. The fast moving changes in voluntary 
offset standards in the period 2007-09 provide a useful illustration of issues central to 
the governance of carbon offset markets as a whole. Moreover, voluntary market 
actors have deliberately positioned the voluntary market as countering some of the 
problems experienced in governing the CDM - in particular too much bureaucracy 
(leading to slow decision-making and project approval), and insufficient attention to 
sustainable development issues - thereby demonstrating how the two markets are 
closely interlinked.  
The diversity of the voluntary offset market (both in terms of type of institutions 
involved, and types of project) is evident in the large number of active voluntary 
offset standards (seventeen in 2008, see [9]) (see Table One and Figure Three). The 
voluntary offset standards provide criteria against which an offset project must be 
assessed, and are mostly modeled on the CDM. Typical voluntary offset standard 
Figure 1a Figure 1b 
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rules and regulations are about: additionality (whether an offset project would have 
happened anyway), the offset approval process (registries, verification, use of 3rd 
party auditors etc.), the type of project allowed (e.g. whether to include industrial gas 
projects, forestry and so on), and sustainable development ‘co-benefits’ (such as job 
creation, improved local air quality etc., benefits that go beyond the project’s 
greenhouse gas reductions).  
Recent attempts to standardise and formalise voluntary carbon offset processes and 
procedures - 2007 was termed ‘the Year of the Standard’ by the 2008 State of the 
Voluntary Market Report [10] - have had two drivers: first, the rapid growth of the 
voluntary market, making transparent governance processes a more pressing concern; 
and, second, a number of criticisms especially from the media, NGOs and some 
governments about the rigorousness and credibility of voluntary carbon offsets [for an 
overview see 11].  Key criticisms have included: the double-counting of offsets 
(where voluntary offsets are resold rather than retired, and are hence claimed as 
emission reductions by more than one organisation) [12], and the use of child labour 
to produce credits [13].   
Conceptually the development of voluntary standards can be seen as an attempt at 
industry ‘self-regulation’ where companies work together to set quality standards in 
order to respond to consumer and media concerns and avoid, anticipate and steer 
government rules to stabilise neoliberal environmental markets [14]. Organisations in 
the voluntary offset market have a delicate balance to set between enhancing the 
credibility of voluntary offsets, and yet maintaining certain advantages of the 
voluntary offset production process, such as the speed of greenhouse gas emission 
reductions, an ability to experiment with new emission reduction methods, and the 
inclusion of sustainable development co-benefits. 
Table One summarises the four international voluntary offset standards which 
currently have the largest market share (representing 79% of the verified voluntary 
offset market). Almost all voluntary offsets produced in 2008 were verified, a total of 
96% (up from 87% in 2007) and by the end of 2008 there were no less than seventeen 
different standards available for project developers to choose from (Hamilton et al., 
2009).  Other voluntary standards with smaller market share (not included in Table 
One) include: Chicago Climate Exchange (3%), Greenhouse Friendly (3%), and the 
Climate, Community & Biodiversity Standard (CCB) (3%). - 
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Name of 
Standard 
Organisation(s) 
involved 
Mark
et 
Share 
(% of 
verifie
d 
credits
) 
Offset 
project 
types 
allowed 
Date 
established 
Averag
e Price 
(US$ 
per 
credit) 
Comments 
Voluntary 
Carbon 
Standard 
(VCS) 
  
Creators: The 
Climate Group, 
the International 
Emissions 
Trading 
Association 
(IETA). 
Supporters: the 
World Economic 
Forum, The 
World Business 
Council for 
Sustainable 
Development 
 
48% All minus 
new 
Hydro 
Fluro 
Carbon 
(HFC) 
industrial 
gas 
projects  
 
 
2007  
(initiated in 
2005) 
5.50 
 
Market-leading global standard for approval of 
voluntary offsets. 
Credits certified via the VCS are called Voluntary 
Carbon Units (VCUs).  
Second version of the VCS launched November 2007 
(pilot version active since 2006) 
Accepts project methodologies approved by the 
CDM and the Climate Action Registry. 
VCS along with 3 registry providers (APX, Caisse 
des Depots, and TZ1) provide the infrastructure for 
the VCS Registry System, operational since early 
2009. 
http://www.v-c-s.org/about.html 
Gold Standard 
(GS) 
Creator: WWF  
Supporters : 
12% Energy 
efficiency, 
2006 14.40 Operates as an additional standard for both the 
compliance (Kyoto) and voluntary carbon offset 
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 endorsed by over 
60 NGOs. Also 
receives funding 
(over $200,000/a) 
from: The 
German Federal 
Ministry for the 
Environment, 
Nature 
Conservation and 
Nuclear Safety, 
Merrill Lynch 
Commodities, 
and Renewable 
Energy and 
Energy 
Efficiency 
Partnership 
(REEEP) 
 
renewable 
energy 
only 
 markets 
Provides best practice methodologies for renewable 
energy and energy efficiency offset projects that 
contribute significantly to sustainable development.  
The Gold Standard is a non-profit foundation 
supported by 60 NGOs.  
There is a registry specifically for Gold Standard 
VERs (managed by the private firm APX) and a 
project database for projects selling Gold Standard-
verified CDM and JI credits as well as VERs. 
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/ 
The Climate 
Action 
Reserve 
(CAR) 
Creators: 
California 
Climate Action 
Registry (CCAR) 
(established by 
the State of 
10% Forestry, 
urban 
forestry, 
landfill, 
and 
livestock 
2008 (CCAR 
operational 
since 2001) 
8.90 Voluntary carbon credits for the United States 
market. 
CAR emerged out of (and is now the parent 
organisation of) the California Climate Action 
Registry (CCAR) and is endorsed by the California 
state government. 
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California (US) 
in 2001). 
Supporters: 
Californian 
Environmental 
Protection 
Agency (EPA), 
the State of 
Pennsylvania, the 
Environmental 
Defense Fund, 
Natural 
Resources 
Defense Council 
and Sierra Club. 
 
methane. 
Others 
under 
developm
ent e.g. 
coal mine 
methane 
Rapid growth during 2008 (rose to 11% of voluntary 
offset market, from negligible base) because it is 
expected that CAR credits will be eligible under a 
future mandatory US carbon markets, termed ‘pre-
compliance’ offsets. 
Credits called Climate Reserve Tonnes (CRT). 
http://www.climateactionreserve.org/ 
American 
Carbon 
Registry 
(ACR) 
Creators: 
Environmental 
Defense Fund, 
Environmental 
Resources Trust, 
Winrock 
International 
Supporters: Blue 
Source, Nike, 
9% All types 
of offset 
project 
2008 
(operational as 
an offset 
registry since 
1997) 
3.80 Established as a non-profit independent registry for 
the early voluntary carbon market, since 2008 has it 
own set of standards and operates both as a voluntary 
emissions reporting registry and an offsets registry.  
The registry accepts offsets verified to ACR 
standards as well as to select other standards’ 
methodologies (e.g.CDM, VCS, and EPA Climate 
Leaders). 
As with the CAR, experienced rapid growth in 2008 
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World Bank, 
Interface 
 
as a likely ‘pre-compliance’ offset in the US. 
ACR’s first voluntary project standard on forest 
carbon launched in March 2009.  
Credits called Emission Reduction Tons (ERTs). 
http://www.americancarbonregistry.org/ 
 
 
Table One - Summary of the four market-leading international voluntary carbon offset standards  
(sources: Hamilton et al., 2009 State of the Voluntary Market Report; Kollmus et. al. (2008)) 
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As Table One illustrates, the price of a voluntary offset varies considerably: the average 
price of VER credits in the over-the-counter market was US$7.34 in 2008 (Hamilton et 
al., 2009), but Gold Standard voluntary credits cost almost double this at US$14.40. The 
premium price of Gold Standard credits stems from the focus of this standard on 
relatively expensive renewable energy and energy efficiency offset projects, as well as its 
stringent sustainable development criteria (including, for example, detailed rules for local 
stakeholder consultation). 
Figure Three and Table Two provide additional summary data on the fast pace of change 
in voluntary offset standards.  Table Two illustrates the rapid growth in two US voluntary 
offset standards – the Climate Action Reserve (CAR) and the American Carbon Registry 
(ACR) in the period 2007-08; both of which only commenced in 2008 and yet reached a 
significant 10% of market share respectively. This dramatic growth reflects hopes that 
voluntary offsets accredited under these standards will become mandatory credits if and 
when the US introduces a national carbon market. Figure Three and Table Two also 
reveal the consolidation of the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS), which had strong 
growth (19%) in 2007-08, and now represents almost half (48%) of all verified voluntary 
credits. 
Name of 
voluntary 
carbon standard 
2007 Market 
Share 
2008 Market 
Share 
% change 
2007-08 
Voluntary Carbon 
Standard 
29% 48% +19% 
Gold Standard 9% 12% +3% 
The Climate 
Action Reserve 
(CAR) 
n/a 10% +10% 
American Carbon 
Registry 
n/a 9% +9% 
Chicago Climate 
Exchange 
7% 3% -4% 
VER+ 9% 2% -7% 
Table Two – Comparison of market share of leading voluntary offset standards: 2007 
and 2008 (source: Hamilton et al., 2009 State of the Voluntary Market Report). 
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Figure Three – Market share of voluntary offset standards (2008) (source: 2009 State of 
the Voluntary Carbon Market Report: 56). 
 
A key governance challenge in developing voluntary offset standards has been the 
relative weighting given to sustainable development issues versus emission reductions. 
There have been ongoing concerns about the degree to which compliance offsetting 
adequately addresses wider sustainable development issues in the Global South, and 
partly as a response to this an important additional feature of voluntary carbon offsets 
compared with compliance offsets produced via the CDM are their sustainable 
development and poverty-alleviation ‘side benefits’ [2, 8].  It is notable, however, that the 
Voluntary Carbon Standard – the current market leader, - ultimately decided to focus just 
on the carbon emission reduction aspects of voluntary offset production, because of the 
difficulties in verifying the diverse and hard-to-measure sustainability benefits arising 
from voluntary offset projects (see Opinion Article (13.1.7)). 
A second tension in the development of voluntary carbon standards has been in balancing 
demands for stricter criteria and audit of voluntary offsetting against the benefits of 
relative speed and low-cost establishment of voluntary offset projects (which has tended 
to encourage the inclusion of smaller community-based projects, and also yields a quicker 
emission reduction benefit to the atmosphere).  The voluntary offset market offers some 
advantages in this respect, because audit procedures have to date not been so onerous. 
The rigour of carbon offset audit and verification procedures was one of the key issues to 
emerge from the UK government’s intervention in the voluntary offset market, in the 
form of a 2009 Quality Assurance Scheme for offset providers, discussed below. 
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Case study: UK government regulation of voluntary carbon offsets (2007-09) 
The UK government took the controversial decision in early 2009 to accredit only 
compliance (Kyoto-based) carbon offsets under its new Quality Assurance Scheme 
(QAS) for Carbon Offsetting. Exploring the issues raised by this decision provides a good 
illustration of the most pertinent governance issues currently under consideration across 
both voluntary and compliance carbon offset markets.  The QAS case study illustrates the 
delicate balance to be struck in developing more rigorous governance structures for the 
voluntary market without damaging its benefits.  It is also an example of how a public 
authority – the UK government – has attempted reassert its power in the largely NGO and 
privately-governed voluntary offset market, through establishing new rules and 
regulations in response to concerns that practices of voluntary offsetting were becoming 
detrimental to the carbon offset market as a whole.  
The QAS is a UK Government-led initiative, managed by a private-sector contractor, 
AEA Group Plc, and with input from an Advisory Forum (including corporate and NGO 
members). It is aimed at providing voluntary offset consumers with better information 
and assurance about what they are purchasing, and involves use of a quality kitemark that 
demonstrates the offsets have met QAS requirements and procedures [15]. Offset 
providers are free to choose whether to apply for the QAS kitemark or not; it is not 
mandatory (and indeed only a few have done so, see below). The rules of the QAS have 
been set by the UK government, with input from stakeholders.  The initial consultation on 
regulating voluntary carbon offsets was launched in January 2007, a Draft Code of Best 
Practice for Voluntary Carbon Offset Providers was then published in February 2008, and 
final details of the QAS published in January 2009, almost a year late (ENDS, 2009).  
Arguably, however, very little changed in substance of government proposals over this 
two year period: from the outset the government recommended including only 
compliance offsets (from the CDM, and European Emissions Trading Scheme) and 
carbon offset organisations were vigorously opposed to the idea of excluding voluntary 
market offsets (VERs). 
In response to the launch of the QAS in early 2009 most key voluntary offset 
organisations said they were not going to apply for accreditation because the leading 
voluntary standards (the VCS and Gold Standard) had been excluded [16]. To date only 
four offset organizations, two companies and two trade organizations have had their 
voluntary offset products accredited (DECC, 2009a).  However, there does remain 
provision in the QAS to allow for accreditation of voluntary offsets in the coming years if 
rigorous, credible voluntary offset standards do emerge, thereby giving the voluntary 
offset industry an incentive to self-regulate.  The QAS states:  “… Voluntary Emissions 
Reduction credits (VERs) may also be allowed at a future point, subject to a satisfactory 
level of assurance becoming available about their quality, and especially additionality.” 
[17: 2]. Indeed, several industry experts, in interview (including individuals directly 
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involved in developing VCS, and senior civil servants in the UK government), suggested 
that if the launch of the Voluntary Carbon Standard (the market leader, see Table One) 
had not been repeatedly delayed in the period 2006-07 then the UK government might 
not have implemented the QAS, thereby highlighting the flexibility of boundaries 
between public and private authority in the governance of carbon offsets. 
From the UK Government’s perspective there was a strong desire through the QAS to 
establish rigorous governance procedures and processes for voluntary offsets because the 
government views itself as ultimately responsible for consumer protection.  It is seen by 
the government as its duty to ensure that people are not being sold something –a carbon 
offset - that does not do what it claims, i.e. take carbon out of the atmosphere. A further 
key reason given by the UK government for the implementation of the 2009 QAS was 
that there is a comprehensive governance structure for an international offsets in place –
the CDM – and that is it best to make use of these rigorous, state-based rules and 
regulations, as a UK official explained: “The UK government’s position is that we have 
invested an awful lot in setting up a system [the CDM] … so that it makes sense to use 
that, because that is something – although it is not perfect – it is something we’ve 
invested a lot of time and effort into getting as good as we can.” (Interview, UK 
Department of the Environment, June 2007).  
Yet with the voluntary offset industry largely shunning the QAS [16] (with only four UK-
based offset organizations so far signed up, out of a possible twenty or more), it appears 
that the UK government’s authority to regulate voluntary offsets is constrained. In effect 
offset organisations have rejected and made irrelevant the UK government’s QAS by the 
major offset organisations saying they are not going to sign up for it.  A joint industry 
statement by ICROA (the International Carbon Reduction and Offset Alliance, a 
voluntary offset organization industry body) and the Carbon Markets & Investors 
Association in response to the launch of the QAS stated: 
“In our view VERs developed under robust voluntary standards are equally effective in 
achieving emissions reductions as Kyoto compliant instruments while providing 
important cobenefits such as the promotion of sustainable development, the alleviation of 
poverty, and in some cases, the restoration of critical ecosystems and habitat. We believe 
that since the inception of the scheme in 2007, DECC [UK Department of Energy and 
Climate Change] has failed to keep pace with developments in the voluntary carbon 
market which has significantly progressed in sophistication, quality, and self-regulation.” 
http://www.icroa.org/pdf/ICROA_Q&A_on_DECC_Quality_Assurance_scheme.pdf 
The QAS case highlights the powerful role of carbon offset organizations in relation to 
nation-states and other public authorities. Uncertainty has been voiced by the offset 
organisations about the ultimate authority of the UK government in what has become an 
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international market for voluntary offsets, developed and governed by non-state actors.  
As the above quotation illustrates,  in the debate about QAS carbon offset organizations 
have positioned themselves as having better knowledge and expertise in offsetting than 
the UK government, with concerns expressed about the poor level of government 
understanding of offsets, and with a prevailing view of governments and international 
state-based organisations as poorly informed and out of date.  As a manager of an 
international voluntary offset organisation stated: “the DEFRA Code [latterly the QAS]… 
is founded on a complete lack of understanding of what is actually happening on the 
ground.” (Interview, October 2007).  The net effect of this for UK offset organizations is 
that initiatives led by non-state actors have been equally as important as the QAS in 
prompting the development of voluntary offsets standards, including from the media, the 
financial sector and corporate clients.  In other words, different types of authority – 
public and private - are intricately mixed from the perspective of offset organizations, and 
they negotiate through and operate within these hybrid fast-changing governance 
networks. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this brief Focus Article provides some insights into why the governance of 
carbon offsets is important, the key issues at stake, and how we might best understand 
voluntary and compliance offset governance challenges.  Carbon offsets are produced 
within two separate, although inter-linked, markets: voluntary and compliance. These two 
markets do however share common governance issues, for instance in balancing 
bureaucracy with speed and transparency in the production of offsets. Indeed, the 
compliance and voluntary markets have evolved over time in parallel, and leading 
organisations in the voluntary market have deliberately positioned the voluntary market 
as able to counteract some of the perceived failings of the CDM. These are complex, 
intricate governance debates – for instance regarding methodologies for measuring and 
producing carbon credits - that often appear to be dissociated from the problem of climate 
change itself. It is important though that connections are maintained, particularly looking 
forward to the future when climate change is likely to manifest more clearly, and, for 
example, attention might increasingly be directed towards offset projects that meet 
standards for climate change adaptation as well as sustainable development. 
Notes 
1 Note that the Kyoto Protocol also includes a secondary, smaller carbon offset market 
called ‘Joint Implementation’ (JI), which allows emission reduction projects to be 
initiated and hosted by Annex 1 partner countries, producing credits called Emission 
Reduction Units (ERUs) is not discussed here. 
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